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IRONIES IN THE CITY: 
REFLECTIONS ON STEVEN SMITH’S 
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY 
PERRY DANE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of Steven Smith’s new book, Pagans and Christians in 
the City1, is compelling, even lyrical.  His account of the religious 
sensibility2 is powerful and convincing.  Smith’s book is also more 
nuanced and hedged-about in its historical and theoretical claims 
than one would suppose from a headline account that would focus 
only on his two chapters near the end3 that drill down on 
contemporary issues in the so-called culture wars. 
As a religious believer,4 I share some of Smith’s concerns 
with the most arrogant expressions of contemporary secularism, 
though I also happen to be a strict separationist in the American 
constitutional context.5  And as a believer in fundamental human 
rights, I worry about how long a godless world would be able to 
sustain a set of commitments ultimately rooted in the sheer fact 
that human beings were created in the image of God.6 
Nevertheless, some deep ironies and puzzles run through the 
text of Pagans and Christians.  Smith is too careful and subtle to 
ignore these undercurrents entirely.  But it will be worth 
bringing them to the surface, not only for their own sake but 
because they might help suggest an alternative to Smith’s most 
rough-edged claims.  My aim in this essay is not merely to nit-
pick.  Any work as magisterial as Smith’s book will generalize 
and elide along the way.  But I do hope by the accumulation of 
details to suggest a fundamental worry that goes to the most 
 
† Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. 
1 STEPHEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS 
FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018) [hereinafter PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS]. 
2 See generally id. at ch. 2. 
3 See generally id. at ch. 10–11. 
4 See Perry Dane, Judaism, Pluralism, and Constitutional Glare, 16 RUTGERS J. 
L. & RELIGION 282 (2015). 
5 See Perry Dane, Establishment and Encounter, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
LAW AND RELIGION 125–53 (2018). 
6 See NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS (2008). 
4 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 57:3   
charged words and phrases at the heart of the book’s title—
“pagans” and “culture wars.” 
I. TRANSCENDENT PAGANS, IMMANENT  
CHRISTIANS, . . . AND JEWS 
The first irony is theological.  Smith relies for much of his 
argument on the sharp distinction he wants to draw between 
paganism—in both its classical Roman and modern secularist 
forms—and Christianity.  To be sure, these three phenomena are 
radically different from each other.  But Smith’s recurring focus 
on pagan “immanence” and Christian “transcendence” does not 
adequately capture those differences. 
A. Divinity 
“Transcendence” means at least three things for Smith.  For 
one, he argues that while the pagan Gods were beings in the 
world, the Christian God is ultimately beyond the world.  This 
sharp dichotomy does not do justice to the important 
philosophical expressions of Greek and Roman religious thought, 
not the least of which was Aristotle’s conception—deeply 
influential on later Jewish and Christian thought—of God as 
prime cause and unmoved mover.  More to the point, perhaps, 
some later Roman thinkers in that Hellenistic tradition 
understood the various gods of the pantheon, and the gods of 
other pantheons, as expressing in cognizable terms the deeper, 
infinite and ineffable reality of the transcendent God.  The 
Roman author Sallust, for example, argued that the ultimate God 
was unchanging, eternal, incorporeal, and incomprehensible.  
That highest God, or first cause, was transcendence itself—
“essentially distinct . . . from the multitude of gods which he 
ineffably comprehends.”7 
Conversely, Smith’s account minimizes the central claim of 
Christian faith—the incarnation of the third person of the Trinity 
as Jesus Christ, who was wholly God and wholly man.  As Rowan 
Williams, the retired Archbishop of Canterbury has put it, 
Christians are “enabled to speak of God as God is (not merely as 
God is not, as the inaccessible Other) because of what is made 
actual in the fleshly reality of Jesus, the divine act which 
establishes the community of thanksgiving and service speaking 
 
7 SALLUST, ON THE GODS AND THE WORLD 7 (1793) 
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God’s praise and addressing God as Abba.”8  The incarnational 
dimension of Christianity is not a mere add-on to a more purely 
transcendent faith; it goes “all the way down.”9 
Ironically, traditional Jewish thought long treated 
Christianity as akin to paganism because of its core 
incarnational and Trinitarian commitments.  That charge was 
unfair, but not entirely silly.  In any event, Judaism in its own 
way has also always emphasized the important tension between 
the transcendent and immanent faces of God—the Godhead the 
loving Father, the ultimate reality and the spirit of the Shekinah 
that goes into exile with her people.  Indeed, if one were to look 
for a truly absolute, uncompromised, account of the transcendent 
God, it would have to be in the more recent deist notion of a God 
who sets creation in motion and leaves it at that.  By the 
measure of such entirely abstracted notions of God, paganism, 
Judaism, Christianity all seem more alike than different from 
each other. 
B. Goods 
“Transcendence” for Smith also refers to a concern for 
transcendent goods, including eternal life, in contrast to 
paganism’s efforts to sacralize the goods of this world.10  Here, 
interestingly, though, it is Judaism that immediately looks more 
“pagan” by Smith’s lights.  Consider only Rabbi Joseph B. 
 
8 ROWAN WILLIAMS, CHRIST THE HEART OF CREATION: THE TENSION AND 
METAPHYSICS OF THEOLOGY 241–42 (2018). Elsewhere in the same book, 
commenting on an essay by Erich Przywara, Archbishop Williams argues that: 
Consciously echoing Augustine, Przywara insists that union with the 
immaterial and transcendent God can only occur in union with the 
suffering, struggling, compromised body/Body on earth, living out God’s 
descent into the depths.45 Thus what he has to say about method in 
metaphysics is paralleled by a prescription for theology: authentic theology 
shows itself, in self-forgetting and self-dispossessing practice. The theology 
that we write and discuss has no substance independently of this formal 
content, this knowledge of how to ‘enact Christ’ in the world. 
Id. at 248. See also STANLEY HAUERWAS, WORKING WITH WORDS: ON LEARNING TO 
SPEAK CHRISTIAN 175 (2011) (“For Christians, immanence first and foremost names 
that God became man that we might participate in the very life of God. So nothing 
can be more immanent than God with us. Transcendence, moreover, is . . . the other 
side of God’s immanence.”). 
9 Perry Dane, Paths and Wrong Turns in the Jewish-Christian Encounter, 
(unpublished paper) presented at “Fulfilling the Promise of a New Relationship: An 
Academic Roundtable on Christian-Jewish Relations,” (January 7, 2019) (on file with 
the author). 
10 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 211. 
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Soloveitchik’s brilliant account in Halakhic Man,11 in which he 
emphasizes the central Jewish commitment to discovering the 
legally precise sacred meaning in everything that is quotidian—
food, drink, the sunrise, the seasons, walls and parapets, torts, 
and contracts.  Nor should we overlook Christianity’s own 
materiality, expressed not only through sacramental theology but 
most vividly in the obsession in the middle ages—that most 
Christian of eras—with relics and pilgrimages.12  More centrally, 
though, Smith pays too little attention to early Christianity’s 
defining decision to reject both the Marcionite claim that the 
Creator God of the Hebrew Bible was a mere evil demiurge and 
Gnostic efforts to treat the material world as irreparably vile in 
its materiality. 
C. Truth 
Finally, Smith suggests that Christianity is “transcendent” 
in its commitment to absolute, objective, truth.  Concededly, 
Christianity has almost from its start focused on credal 
commitments in contrast to the “pagan” interest in correct 
practice.  Again, though, Judaism is the test case that undoes 
this simple dichotomy.  Judaism, like Smith’s paganism, is 
concerned with practice more than creed.  It also has a 
complicated view of propositional commitments, as the famous 
story of the Oven of Akhnai demonstrates, with its account of 
God rejoicing in the rabbinic elevation of human majority rule 
over heavenly DECLARATION of the Truth.13  And ask even a very 
traditional Jew whether he or she “believes” the Midrash and 
Aggadah, and one is likely to get an answer that suspiciously 
resembles some “pagan” responses to whether they “believe” in 
the gods.  The same might be said, for that matter, of Hindu 
responses to whether they “believe” in their own multiplicity of 
divinities.  The point is not that these traditions reject the search 
for Truth, but rather that they deeply appreciate the prismatic 
complexity of Truth. 
The Christian story, understood in all its breadth, actually 
shares that same appreciation.  For underneath the admitted 
commitment to propositional, credal, articulation, there have 
always been profound contrary traces, from the Emperor 
 
11 JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC MAN (1984). 
12 See JONATHAN SUMPTION, THE AGE OF PILGRIMAGE: THE MEDIEVAL JOURNEY 
TO GOD (1975). 
13 B. Talmud, Bava Metzia 59a-b. 
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Constantine’s complaints about, as Smith puts it, “intricate 
theological disputations”14 to the Eastern Orthodox emphasis on 
non-propositional mysteries15 to Meister Eckhart’s mystical 
recognition of the “nothingness of God”16 to contemporary 
Christians’ focus, in both evangelical circles and the attitude of 
the current Pope, on the centrality of an existential encounter 
with Jesus over and above any formulaic abstractions. 
Meanwhile, confidence in transcendent truth often appears 
in full force on the other side of the dichotomies that Smith 
wants to construct.  Classical Greek and Roman thought—not all 
of it, but enough—was as committed to Truth as any credal 
Christian.  Just think of Plato or Aristotle or Seneca.  And while 
our contemporary age is plagued by an overabundance of cheap, 
unreflective, skepticism and relativism, many of the most 
thoughtful articulators of secular thought are fully committed to 
the search for Truth.  Secular moral philosophers, for example, 
continue to debate the claims of moral realism,17 but most come 
down in favor, happily committing themselves to that and other 
immaterial truths even in what might be a godless world.  Smith 
himself discusses at some length the legacy of Ronald Dworkin.  
He does not find Dworkin’s account of godless moral realism 
convincing, but that is not really to the point.  These questions 
are hard, and the religious effort to combine a belief in absolute 
moral truths with belief in a God who commands is at least 
equally difficult to sustain, as Plato most famously recognized in 
the Euthyphro.18 
D. Frames 
So why does Smith, for all his subtlety and nuance, still stick 
to his sharp distinction between the “transcendent” world of 
Christians and the “immanent” world of both ancient and modern 
pagans?  One reason is surely polemical.  Hard lines make for 
severer critiques.  In this connection, it is telling that Smith 
 
14 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 167. 
15 See KALLISTOS WARE, THE ORTHODOX WAY (rev. ed., St. Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press 1995) (1979). 
16 See Bernard McGinn, Hidden God and Hidden Self: the emergence of 
apophatic anthropology in Christian mysticism, in HISTORIES OF THE HIDDEN GOD: 
CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION IN GNOSTIC, ESOTERIC, AND MYSTICAL TRADITIONS 
87, 96–98 (April D. DeConick & Grant Adamson, eds., Routledge 2014) (2013). 
17 See GILBERT HARMAN & JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, MORAL RELATIVISM AND 
MORAL OBJECTIVITY (1996). 
18 PLATO, EUTHYPHRO (Benjamin Jowett, trans., 1871). 
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refers often to the work of Jan Assmann, who employed the 
immanent-transcendent distinction to serve even more polemical 
ends, though Assmann (ironically enough?) argued that Western 
religion had turned violent and oppressive precisely because it 
took up a “transcendent” view of God and truth.19 
A more interesting possibility is that Smith’s thesis reveals 
his own embeddedness in the metaphysical assumptions of 
modernity.  Charles Taylor has famously argued that we the 
denizens of modernity (defined in terms of the past several 
hundred years) understand reality through an “immanent 
frame.”20  The physical world of that immanent frame is 
disenchanted, material, and explainable by science.  Similarly, 
our social world is marked by the passage of secular time and the 
valorization of instrumental rationality.  This modern immanent 
frame does not exclude the possibility of religion and religious 
faith, though it does render such faith eminently contestable.  
More to the current point, even religious believers in modernity 
understand the world by way of the immanent frame so that if a 
divine reality does exist, it must create the world and impinge on 
its affairs from the outside, to so speak.  The everyday world 
defined by the immanent frame “constitutes a ‘natural’ order, to 
be contrasted with a supernatural one, an ‘immanent’ world over 
against a possible ‘transcendent’ one.”21  To put it another way, 
Smith’s singular focus (and ours) on the polarity of “immanence” 
and “transcendence” might be at least in part an artifact of his 
(and our) distinctly modern experience of both. 
To see this point more clearly, imagine for a moment a 
metaphysic defined by a “transcendent frame.”  From within that 
radically different frame, “immanence is saturated with 
transcendence.”22  The fundamental question is not how God 
could exist in the face of a causally self-sufficient material world, 
 
19 See, e.g., JAN ASSMANN, THE PRICE OF MONOTHEISM (Robert Savage, trans., 
Stanford University Press 2009) (2003). To be sure, it is entirely consistent for Smith 
to borrow from Assmann’s picture of a fundamental distinction between immanent 
and transcendent religions while disagreeing with Assmann’s critique of 
transcendent religions. But it is still awkward. 
20 CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 542 (2007). For a helpful and illuminating 
introduction to Taylor’s thesis and its implications, see JAMES K. A. SMITH, HOW 
(NOT) TO BE SECULAR: READING CHARLES TAYLOR (2014). 
21 TAYLOR, supra note 20, at 542. 
22 Alexander J. B. Hampton, Transcendence and Immanence: Deciphering Their 
Relation through the Transcendentals in Aquinas and Kant, 34 TORONTO J. 
THEOLOGY 187 (2018) reproduced in Advance Online version on Project MUSE, at 8, 
muse.jhu.edu/article/707948. See also id. at 7. 
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but instead how the material world—the world of creation—could 
exist in the shadow of an infinite, all-encompassing, divine 
reality that might seem to exclude anything else. 
Thomas Aquinas and other Western medieval philosophers 
tackled this problem by positing notions of transcendence and 
immanence, and the relationship between the two, deeply at odds 
with the modern mindset.  As one scholar has put it: 
Aquinas maintains that “deus est omnia ut causa omnium” 
(“God is everything as the cause of everything”).  Consequently, 
God cannot be understood as something transcendent over and 
against immanent creation.  Rather, as the cause of everything, 
God is radically transcendent, distinguished from everything as 
the First Being (primum ens) and not dependent upon any prior 
cause for existence as “Being itself” (ipsum esse per se 
subsistens).  At the same time, also as the cause of everything, 
God is also immanent, since all creatures participate in God, 
who determines their natures.  It is through this immanence 
that we come to know transcendence . . . .23 
Or consider a different example of a “transcendent frame.”  
For the Jewish Kabbalists who developed Lurianic mysticism 
and its offshoots, the response to the puzzle of creation in the 
face of divine infinitude was a form of kenosis—the idea that the 
God who filled the entire span of reality engaged in a voluntary 
act of contraction known as tzimtzum to establish a space within 
which the world could exist.24  God in this vision does not create 
the world or act on it from an external perch, so to speak, but 
rather transforms a piece of the divine into the immanent world.  
That transformation is always partial and provisional, however, 
leading to an exquisite array of gradations, and linkages and 
influences running in both directions, between the immanent 
world and the transcendent Godhead.  Moreover, in some 
interpretations of this mystical and mysterious vision, the 
tzimtzum was not an act of contraction at all, but rather of 
 
23 Id. at 7. Note that the notion of “cause” at work here is not the sort of 
mechanical cause posited both by modern science and by contemporary religious 
supporters of notions such as “intelligent design,” but a metaphysical cause that 
sustains the very possibility of material existence from moment to moment. See 
EDWARD FESER, FIVE PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (2017). 
 For a very different account of the centralty of immanence in any faith that looks 
to the self-emptying of both God and human beings, see ALEX DUBILER, THE SELF-
EMPTYING SUBJECT: KENOSIS AND IMMANENCE, MEDIEVAL TO MODERN (2018). 
24 See JOSEPH DAN, GERSHOM SCHOLEM AND THE MYSTICAL DIMENSION OF 
JEWISH HISTORY 260–68 (1987); NORMAN LAMM, THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF 
HASIDISM: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 6–7, 40–49 (1999). 
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concealment.25  It is only from our limited perspective that we 
imagine a distinction between the immanent world and the 
transcendent God in the first place; from the divine perspective, 
which is truth itself, all such categories dissolve.26 
All this is admittedly knotty.  But the larger takeaways from 
this excursion are more straightforward. 
To begin with, in aligning certain modern trends with 
Roman paganism, Smith elides—even on his own terms—the 
vast difference between an ancient belief in immanent gods and a 
modern belief in an immanent world.  More to the point, in the 
larger sweep of history, the most relevant distinction might not 
be between “pagans” (both ancient and modern) inhabiting an 
impoverished “immanent,” world and Christians committed to a 
transcendent God.  Instead, following Taylor, the really profound 
distinction might be between all pre-modern people (Christians, 
Jews, and pagans alike) who saw the divine and the world 
through a common transcendent frame and all of us moderns 
(Christians, Jews, secularists, and all the rest) who see reality 
through an immanent frame—a frame so powerful that we can at 
most only bracket it temporarily through an exercise of 
sympathetic imagination. 
II. PAGAN CHRISTIANS AND CHRISTIAN PAGANS 
The first major irony in Pagans and Christians, then, is that 
Smith, very much a modern thinker, draws too sharp a 
distinction between transcendent and immanent world-views in 
their pre-modern forms.  The second irony follows from the first, 
though it can also be stated independently.  In Smith’s grand 
historical narrative, Christianity overcame paganism, but 
elements of paganism now threaten to reassert themselves in the 
guise of contemporary popular culture and legal mischief.  Smith 
concedes that elements of paganism have always been with us, 
even at the height of the Christian dispensation.  But he still sees 
the two world-views as essentially dichotomous.  The irony, 
though, is that Christianity did not merely overcome paganism, 
it also drew heavily on some of its core intellectual and spiritual 
structures, and then Christianity in some sense returned the 
 
25 See RACHEL ELIOR, THE PARADOXICAL ASCENT TO GOD: THE KABBALISTIC 
THEOSOPHY OF HABAD HASIDISM 88–90 (Jeffrey M. Green, trans., 1993); LAMM, 
supra note 24, at 45 n.138. See also DAN COHN-SHERBOK, FIFTY KEY JEWISH 
THINKERS 35 (1997). 
26 See ELIOR, supra note 25, at 88–90; LAMM, supra note 24, at 45 n.138. 
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favor by nurturing the fundamental ideas out of which 
modernity, including the phenomena that Smith identifies as 
pagan, was eventually born. 
As the historian Paula Fredriksen emphasizes, in the early 
years when the Jesus movement that would eventually become 
Christianity was in its infancy, Jews and pagans mixed much 
more easily, socially and otherwise, than we might think.  
Pagans visited synagogues and Jews donated to pagan 
institutions.  She argues that it was precisely that milieu of 
casual contact that allowed and encouraged the Apostle Paul to 
begin his outreach to the gentiles, an outreach that eventually 
led to the decisive break between Jews and Christians.27  Later, 
during the long period when many Jews lived as a subject 
minority under Christian rule, they often referred to the 
Christian world as Edom (Esau), the same label that they had 
attached to pagan Imperial Rome.  Even putting such polemics 
aside, it is undeniable that the fundamental Christian separation 
from Judaism did not merely rest on the Christian absorption 
into the structures of the Roman political world or on the 
Christian religious commitment to the divinity of Jesus, but most 
vitally on its absorption of classical Greek and Roman conceptual 
categories and intellectual methodologies as the frame within 
which it articulated and understood that commitment.  That 
synthesis—which includes the credal, propositional, approach to 
faith that Smith (in an irony all its own) identifies as distinctly 
anti-pagan, has remained in place, though under increasing 
challenge, ever since.  Indeed, Pope Benedict XVI staked his 
theology, and his arguments about a central difference between 
Christianity and Islam, on what he argued was the indispensable 
“synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit.”28 
Further along the Western cultural journey, what we now 
know as modernity did not spring forth ex nihilo, nor did it 
merely represent a resurgence of paganism.  To the contrary, 
although many secularists would be embarrassed to admit it, the 
modern world, including the conditions that allowed the loss of 
faith among many moderns, was birthed, or at the least 
 
27 See PAULA FREDRIKSEN, WHEN CHRISTIANS WERE JEWS: THE FIRST 
GENERATION (2018). 
28 Pope Benedict XVI, Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and 
Reflections, Lecture at the University of Regensburg (Sept. 12, 2006), http://w2.va 
tican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe 
_20060912_university-regensburg.html. 
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midwifed, by Christian ideals.  It is by now a historical truism, 
for example, that the origins of modern science had a good deal to 
do with Jewish and Christian assumptions about the potential 
decipherability of a universe brought into being by orderly 
creator God.29  Similarly, modern liberalism, with its 
assumptions about human nature and human equality, traces 
back to the decisive moral revolution that Christians, inspired by 
Jews, brought to the West.30  Even the idea of the “secular,” 
largely unknown to pagans, was a Christian insight.  And more 
complex patterns of causation are apparent if we look specifically 
at the influence of the Protestant Reformation or for that matter, 
if some so-called Radical Orthodox thinkers are to be believed, 
the influential but dangerous turn of Duns Scotus in the 
thirteenth century to a univocal theology of the relation between 
God and the world.31 
The larger point here is simple: Smith is very good at 
identifying binaries and polarities.  But he seems much less 
interested in recognizing dialectics and internal tensions. 
III. THE LONG IN-BETWEEN 
A third irony, which comes closer to the headline piece of 
Smith’s more extended argument: Although Smith devotes 
proportionally fewer pages to the long period of Christendom 
between the conversion of Constantine and the rise of secular 
liberal states, one might get the impression that he views that 
period, even with all its faults (absolutism, Crusades, wars, 
persecution of Jews, heretics, and dissidents, and so on) as in 
some respects at least a blessed age, free of the worst influences 
of the pagan temptation.  Yet many serious, devout, Christians 
have long considered the Constantinian turn to be Christianity’s 
gravest historical error and the release from the official grip of 
Christendom to be Christianity’s best hope for the future.32  (Note 
that the end of Christendom, though related in complicated ways 
 
29 See, e.g., REIJER HOOYKAAS, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF MODERN SCIENCE 
(1972); JOHN HEDLEY BROOKE, SCIENCE AND RELIGION: SOME HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES (1991). 
30 See, e.g., LARRY SIEDENTOP, INVENTING THE INDIVIDUAL: THE ORIGINS OF 
WESTERN LIBERALISM (2014). 
31 See JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY BEYOND SECULAR 
REASON xxiv–xxvi (2006); Catherine Pickstock, Duns Scotus: His Historical and 
Contemporary Significance, 21 MOD. THEOLOGY 543 (2005). 
32 To my mind, the canonical work on this theme is STANLEY HAUERWAS, AFTER 
CHRISTENDOM (1991). 
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to the birth of Taylor’s “secular age,” is conceptually distinct from 
it.33)  This vision of an emancipated Christianity without 
Christendom was surely the hope, for example, of Roger 
Williams.  Similarly, James Madison, in his famous 
Remonstrance, argued that “During almost fifteen centuries has 
the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial.  What have 
been its fruits?  More or less in all places, pride and indolence in 
the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, 
superstition, bigotry and persecution.”34  Today, many thoughtful 
Christians celebrate not only the official end of Christian political 
establishment, but also the end of the historic era in which the 
culture valorized Christianity while Christianity served as a 
meek apologist for the culture’s failure to live up to genuine 
Christian ideals.35  These Christians do not renounce any effort 
to influence the larger culture.  But they insist on maintaining a 
prophetic voice, critical distance, and a certain necessary 
alienation that was too often impossible during the long episode 
of Christian hegemony.36 
IV. GRAND NARRATIVES AND LEGAL CONUNDRUMS 
Finally, there’s an irony apparent in those headline two 
chapters in which Smith most directly sets his sights on what he 
considers to be the rise of a new paganism.  The irony is simple: 
In coming near the end of his large-scale, even magisterial, 
survey of paganism and Christianity, with powerful asides on the 
texture of religious thought, Smith ends up focusing on a series of 
contemporary questions that seem profoundly small-bore by 
comparison and whose treatment in Smith’s hands is often 
incomplete. 
 
33 For one thing, official Christendom persisted in some places even into 
modernity. For another, modern secularity has had deep cultural and religious 
consequences outside the historic strongholds of Latin Christendom. See MIRJAM 
KÜNKLER, JOHN MADELEY, & SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, A SECULAR AGE BEYOND THE 
WEST: RELIGION, LAW, AND THE STATE IN ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND NORTH 
AFRICA (2018). 
34 James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
June 20, 1785, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 29, 32 (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 1999). 
35 See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS: 
LIFE IN THE CHRISTIAN COLONY (1989). 
36 See also MIROSLAV VOLF, PUBLIC FAITH: HOW FOLLOWERS OF CHRIST SHOULD 
SERVE THE COMMON GOOD (2011). The demise of political Christendom is surely 
related to the birth of Taylor’s “immanent frame,” though I will not try here to begin 
to trace the subtleties of those connections. 
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What I’m calling the “small-bore” dimension of Smith’s 
critique has several layers.  First, Smith dates the rise of what he 
thinks is a new paganism, not to the past several hundred years 
of modernity or even the past hundred years, but to the latter 
part of the twentieth century.37  Second, he zooms in on the 
United States even though the cultural developments he’s 
describing should in principle be much more sweeping.  Third, 
even within that ambit, Smith focuses on a set of questions that 
have been at or near the fore of the so-called American “culture 
wars” between left and right. 
Some of this is understandable.  Smith is a distinguished law 
professor, and despite the large-scale ambitions of the book, he 
might be forgiven for returning to a set of questions that have 
occupied American political and constitutional debate.  But in 
doing so, he risks overlooking relevant comparisons and 
complexities.  For example, if some of us were being asked to 
identity sites of resurgent “paganism” in the current historic age, 
we might point first of all to Nazi Germany,38 other totalitarian 
states, and their offshoots in various white supremacist and 
other contemporary radical hate groups.39  He also deploys 
himself on one side of what have become embarrassingly 
polarized controversies that sometimes seem to be as much about 
mustering political identities as staking principled positions, let 
alone seeking common ground. 
To get more specific on a few of Smith’s concerns in the last 
part of Pagans and Christians: 
A. The Public Square 
Smith warns about the elimination of public religious 
displays and a Christian-tinged civic religion in American public 
life.  But he pays short shrift to the religious separationist 
impulse, to which I have alluded, that opposes such symbols 
precisely because they threaten to trivialize and even degrade 
 
37 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 259. 
38 Susannah Heschel has argued that Nazi ideology was more entangled with 
certain perverse expressions of Christianity than with modern neo-paganism, 
SUSANNAH HESCHEL ,THE ARYAN JESUS: CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS AND THE BIBLE 
IN NAZI GERMANY 1–3, 195 (2008). But be that as it may, the form of that the Nazis 
espoused was by any description a paganized Christianity. 
39 See MATTIAS GARDELL, GODS OF THE BLOOD: THE PAGAN REVIVAL AND WHITE 
SEPARATISM (2003). 
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religion.40  He also never quite makes the case that the battle 
over religious symbols is part of a genuinely consequential war 
between Christianity and a resurgent paganism.  For one thing, 
countries that have kept their public religious symbols and 
practices, including Britain with its English religious 
establishment, are in most respects more secular, and even more 
“pagan,” than the United States.  And for another, it is precisely 
with respect to the increasingly tiresome fights over crosses, 
creches, and the like that the American battlefront often seems 
to involve (sometimes on both sides) a purely tribal politics with 
little of substance undergirding it. 
B. Sex 
Smith also points to battles over sex and a resurgent “pagan” 
sensibility of untrammeled sexual gratification.  Sex is 
significant, as is its relationship to broader forces in human 
history and culture.  There is also something to regret in our 
contemporary morality of sex.  But there was also a good deal to 
regret in the sexual morality of other periods, including during 
the heyday of Christendom.41  It is simply hard for any culture to 
get sex right, and I’m not sure that any culture has. 
Smith also overplays the idea that contemporary sexual 
excesses reflect a quintessentially “pagan” view.  For one thing, 
Roman paganism did not lack a sexual morality of its own and on 
its own terms.42  For another, it is hard to sustain the thesis that 
a loosening of sexual norms stems directly from an immanent or 
“pagan” metaphysics in the face of the tendency of the most 
“godless” totalitarian regimes of recent times to also be deeply 
traditional, even puritanical, in their effort to control the sexual 
practices of their citizens.43  Moreover, there is at least one vital 
respect in which the modern sexual culture that Smith describes 
wears its Christian influences in a way that might entirely 
confound Roman pagans, and that is its affirmation—in principle 
if not necessarily in practice—that the same basic sexual norms 
 
40 See Perry Dane, Prayer is Serious Business: Reflections on Town of Greece, 15 
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 611 (2014); Perry Dane, Separation Anxiety, 22 J. L. & 
RELIGION 545 (2007) (reviewing NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S 
CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (2005)). 
41 A more complete discussion would also need to consider the complex history 
and theology of Jewish sexual norms. 
42 See REBECCA LANGLANDS, SEXUAL MORALITY IN ANCIENT ROME (2002). 
43 See, e.g., DAVID L. HOFFMANN, STALINIST VALUES: THE CULTURAL NORMS OF 
SOVIET MODERNITY 1917-1941, 88–117 (2003). 
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should apply equally to men and women.  Smith treats this 
difference between ancient and modern sex-positivity as a mere 
detail, 44 but one might just as easily treat it as a primary 
variable rooted in a decidedly post-pagan account of our common 
human dignity.  Finally, it merits some notice that the “culture 
war” over sex, as a practical matter, has ended up turning on the 
question of same-sex marriage, whose supporters, far from 
representing the extreme of modern secular sexual liberation, 
were actually engaged in a decidedly “conservative” campaign 
(recognized as such by critics to their left45) to extend the benefits 
of “traditional” marriage to persons to whom it could not 
otherwise, if they were true to themselves, be available.46 
C. Religious Liberty 
Smith also worries about new challenges to “religious 
liberty,” especially as dissenters from the new consensus about 
same-sex marriage, abortion, and other practices seek to insulate 
themselves from laws that they believe would require them to be 
complicit in those expressions of the new “paganism.”  The 
question here, though, which I have discussed elsewhere,47 is why 
admittedly important but relatively conventional disputes over 
the proper balance to be struck between religious rights and the 
urgent interests of the wider society (as well as the potential 
rights of third parties) have been transformed (often by both 
sides) into apocalyptic battles in which each side accuses the 
other of “weaponizing” legal rights for the sake of prevailing in 
the larger war for America’s soul.  As with the debate over same-
sex marriage, to which it has lately been tightly tethered, 
genuine complexities and complications get too easily lost if we 
too quickly deploy labels such as “Christian” and “pagan” or 
resort to the metaphor of “culture wars.” 
 
44 PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS, supra note 1, at 286 (“Modern sexual norms run 
parallel in important respects to ancient pagan attitudes and practices—except that 
these attitudes and practices have been extended to include women as well as 
men.”). 
45 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE 
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999). 
46 See Perry Dane, Natural Law, Equality, and Same-Sex Marriage, 62 BUFF. L. 
REV. 291 (2014). 
47 See Perry Dane, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Costs of Weaponization, 
BERKLEY CENTER FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS, BERKLEY CTR. 
RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFAIRS: BERKLEY F. (July 2, 2018), https://berkley 
center.georgetown.edu/responses/masterpiece-cakeshop-and-the-costs-of-
weaponization. 
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CONCLUSION: TOGETHER IN THE CITY 
My various observations about the argument in Smith’s 
Pagans and Christians end up following one from the other to 
form a single narrative.  To begin with, Smith’s single-minded 
focus on the distinction between pagan immanence and Christian 
transcendence does not sufficiently acknowledge the deep 
interdependence of transcendence and immanence in the 
religoius imagination.  It also neglects other equally important 
distinctions, especially between the transcendent frame that 
united ancient pagans, Jews, and Christians and the 
immanenent frame in which all of us moderns—Christians, Jews, 
and secularists—live.  And, by assimilating Jews to Christians 
and modern immanent folk to ancient pagans, it elides the 
various specific permutations of resemblance and difference 
among these various traditions (and others) that render close to 
impossible any effort to reduce our complex religious history to 
any overarching binary. 
In the light of all that, it should not be suprising that the 
rise of modernity would provoke complex and even contradictory 
reactions even among the religiously-committed.  After all, 
religious believers are both freer—physically and spiritually—
than they were during the long era of Christendom, and—in the 
very exercise of that freedom—less at home in the increasingly 
secular world around them.  And it should be even less suprising 
that many of the legal and social conflicts that animate the 
current culture wars should appear, on reflection, both 
signficantly harder to adjudicate and in the broader sweep of 
history significantly less consequential than they might first 
appear. 
In sum, as I suggested at the start, my effort here to focus on 
some of the ironies and gaps in Smith’s account has sought to 
suggest, in various ways, that what might sometimes seem like 
dichotomies are often complex interweavings, and what might 
seem like spiritual wars are often the profound back-and-forth of 
human spiritual history.  In the end, part of what I have tried to 
bring to these reflections is just a different sensibility.  To my 
mind, culture wars are a sad distraction from the more promising 
path of genuine dialogue.  I am not suggesting simple 
compromise, let alone surrender by one side or the other.  Nor am 
I trying to promote what John Courtney Murray in a different 
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context called “bogus irenicism.”48  But it should surely be 
possible to see in some of our current cultural, political, and legal 
conflicts as not merely “culture wars” but also opportunities for 
genuine engagement, mutual learning, and even dialectical 
transformation.  It might be time to reframe our divisions and 
not merely lament them. 
In that spirit, I look to Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, the first 
Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi in British Mandatory Palestine, who saw 
in secular, even atheist, Jews, a spark of spiritual energy often 
lacking in his fellow Orthodox Jews.49  I look to Pope Francis, 
who affirmed that it is better to be an atheist than a bad 
Christian,50 and who might feel the same way even about modern 
“pagans.”  I look to Sarah Coakley, an Anglican theologian who 
articulates a vision of the Christian Trinity grounded in patristic 
sources but also takes seriously the implications of “divine 
desire” for a vision of human sexuality not beholden to the 
categories of “repression” and “libertinism.”51  I look to William 
Connolly, a secular thinker who explained why he is not a 
“secularist.”52  I look to Terry Eagleton, another secular thinker, 
who seeks to challenge theists and atheists alike with the 
genuinely radical vision that he finds in the Biblical text and 
religious sensibility.53  All of us—Christians, “pagans” of all 
descriptions, Jews, and for that matter, Muslims, Hindus, 
Buddhists, and the rest—have something to teach each other.  It 
might be time to put down the pitchforks and start. 
 
48 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC 
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 136 (1960), https://www.library.geo 
rgetown.edu/woodstock/murray/whtt_c5_1958e. 
49 See YEHUDAH MIRSKY, RAV KOOK: MYSTIC IN A TIME OF REVOLUTION (2014). 
50 See Julie Zauzmer, Pope Francis suggests it’s better to be an atheist than a 




51 SARAH COAKLEY, GOD, SEXUALITY, AND THE SELF: AN ESSAY ‘ON THE TRINITY’ 
(2013). 
52 See WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, WHY I AM NOT A SECULARIST (2000). 
53 See TERRY EAGLETON, REASON, FAITH, AND REVOLUTION: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE GOD DEBATE (2009). 
